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Abstract: The purpose of this study was to contribute to the corporate governance literature by 
establishing the relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance within the non-
life insurance firms in Zimbabwe. The study sought to provide some insights on corporate governance 
since the phenomenon is relatively an emerging discipline in Zimbabwe. The paper sought to 
complement other corporate governance studies that were conducted in other environments by 
producing evidence on the phenomenon from a developing country context. A quantitative research 
approach was adopted and respondents were selected through a stratified random sampling. The results 
of the study confirm that board characteristics (board composition, diversity, and size) exhibit a 
statistically significant positive predictive relationship with the performance of non-life insurance firms 
measured by gross premium written and customer retention. However, CEO/Chairman duality showed 
a negative relationship with business performance. Non-life insurance companies need to be cognizant 
of board characteristics in order to improve their performance. Moreover , the findings in this research 
has practical relevance for the selection process of directors as it highlights the importance of having a 
sizeable number of board members as well as an appropriate mix of competences and qualifications on 
the board. Although corporate governance is has been extensively researched, there is limited study in 
this area from a developing country like Zimbabwe with relatively less developed capital markets. It 
would be wrong to assume that the findings found in other countries can apply here because the 
conditions are different. 
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1. Introduction 
Enough evidence exists to prove that corporate governance in the Zimbabwean 
insurance industry is one of the worst in Africa. For instance, ZIMRE Holdings 
Limited’s non-life insurer SFG Insurance collapsed in 2013 and investigations by 
IPEC revealed that the company had a huge negative solvency and its capital base 
was falling short of the minimum capital threshold. Much evidence also pointed to 
substandard corporate governance structures. Another case worthy noting is that of 
Champions Insurance Company, which has been fingered in the Air Zimbabwe 
insurance scandal where tender procedures were not being followed. Another 
insurance giant, SFG insurance company collapsed and totally went under in 2013. 
Further, the Insurance and Pensions Commission (IPEC) of Zimbabwe recently 
deregistered Global Insurance Company, Jupiter Insurance Company and Excellence 
Insurance Company as a result of poor corporate governance, in spite of booming 
insurance business in Zimbabwe (IPEC, 2013).  
The scandals highlight how board members can abuse positions to influence certain 
transactions in their favour, thereby undermining the performance of the firms. 
Navistar  insurance brokers has been, since 2009, siphoning money from Air 
Zimbabwe through purported insurance programmes which are now emerging to be 
fraudulent. The company’s four directors have since been arrested and await 
sentencing together with their accomplices from Air Zimbabwe (Matambanadzo, 
2014).  
Given the apparent central and integral role of the boards of directors in the day-to-
day running and management of contemporary corporations, this paper seeks to 
analyse the impact of board characteristics on performance of non-life insurance 
companies in Zimbabwe. Particular reference is made to the insurance sector because 
the majority of corporate governance pronouncements, which are sector wide, do not 
address the specific concerns of the insurance sector. Furthermore, majority of these 
corporate governance pronouncements and codes are concerned primarily with the 
single agency relationship between company directors and shareholders, rather than 
accounting for the broad range of principals that are features of the insurance 
companies. Thus, the distinctive characteristics of insurance companies imply the 
need for distinctive corporate governance arrangements for this sector.  
Although corporate governance is has been extensively researched, there is limited 
study in this area from a developing country like Zimbabwe with relatively less 
developed capital markets. Most of studies have been conducted in western and 
Asian countries. For example, in the USA (Bauer, Eichholtz and Kok, 2009, Erkens, 
Hung and Matos, 2012), in Malaysia (Yasser et al., 2011), in the Netherlands 
(Rovers, 2011) and in Australia (Christensen et al., 2010).  It would be wrong to 
assume that the findings found in these countries can apply here because the 
conditions are different. It is against this identified research gap that this study 
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therefore seeks to examine the relationship between key board characteristics and 
the performance of Zimbabwean non-life insurance companies. 
Following this discussion, the main purpose of this study therefore is to establish the 
relationship between board characteristics and corporate performance in non-life 
insurance firms.  
This study contributes to existing knowledge base and understandability on the 
impact of board characteristics on firm performance, since corporate governance by 
its nature is relatively an emerging discipline in Zimbabwe. It is hoped that the 
recommendations from this research will help directors and owners within the 
insurance sector to recognize the significance of corporate governance in enhancing 
performance of their firms. The rest of the article is presented as follows: a review 
of literature and a conceptual framework as well as the hypotheses development are 
presented. Thereafter, the research methodology, the results and the discussion of 
results are provided. The discussion on the managerial implications, limitations and 
avenues for future research studies, are to form the last sections of the study.  
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance, as a concept is difficult to define, as what constitutes it varies 
from country to country due to differences in culture, legal systems and historical 
developments (Wong, 2011). However, there can be no dispute that effective 
accountability to all shareholders, including the diverse interests of other 
stakeholders like lenders, employees and government is the essence of corporate 
governance (Lawal, 2012). Shah, Butt and Saeed (2011) describe it as the way in 
which an organization is administered, directed or controlled. The authors proceed 
to state that corporate governance provides the set of rules and regulations that affect 
how corporations are run and managed, through specifying the distribution of 
responsibilities and rights among stakeholders. Relatedly, Lawal (2012) asserts that 
corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board of directors and stakeholders that provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set and the means of attaining those 
objectives.  
This study is informed mostly by the agency theory and a discussion of the theory 
follows below. 
2.2 The Agency Theory 
The agency theory, premised on the contractual relationship between principals 
(shareholders) and agents (management), suggests that the separation of corporate 
ownership and control potentially leads to self-interested actions by managers. 
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According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a critical notion about the agency theory 
is that managers, who are contracted to perform services on behalf of the 
shareholders, are self-interested and unwilling to sacrifice their personal interests for 
the interests of the shareholders. These self-interests result in an in-born conflict of 
interest amongst the shareholders and management, as managers in general act for 
their own interests and they do not take the best probable action for both the public 
and shareholders (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Daily, Dalton and Canella, 2003). 
This study submits that management may actively maximize their self-interest at the 
expense of organizational profitability. 
2.3 Board Characteristics 
A corporate board is delegated with the task of monitoring the performance, and 
activities of the top management to ensure that latter acts in the best interests of all 
the shareholders. The relationship between various board characteristics such as the 
board size, composition and firm performance has been of enormous interest to some 
researchers for the past decades (Adams et al., 2010). Evidence points much to the 
thinking that the failure of financial services entities to meet stakeholders’ 
expectations is due to poor governance. This has been observed in incidences of 
inadequate internal controls and dominance of individuals resulting in inefficiencies 
and inflated costs of operations. Such was the case at Navistar Insurance Brokers, 
Altfin Insurance, Jupiter Insurance, Standard Fire and General Insurance and Global 
Insurance Company (Insurance and Pensions Commission, 2014). The subsequent 
sections will examine the key variables of the study namely the independent 
variables (board size, board composition, CEO duality and board diversity) and the 
dependent variable (corporate performance). The board composition characteristics 
considered in this research are board size; CEO duality; board diversity and board 
composition.  
2.4 Board Size 
Board size refers to the total number of directors on a firm’s board. Determining the 
ideal board size for organisations is very important because the number and quality 
of quality of directors determines the corporate performance of such firms. The 
underlying economics of this is that as the board size increases, it will reach a point 
of diminishing returns at which there will be negative impacts on the functioning of 
the board, for example when communication and coordination become an arduous 
and time consuming process for the many directors on a large board (Liu and Fong, 
2010). 
To date, there is no universally accepted standard to guide the number of directors a 
firm can have. According to Chinese corporate law, the number of directors on the 
board may be between five to nineteen people (Liu and Fong, 2010). However, 
Lawal (2012) recommended a minimum of seven and a maximum of nine board 
members. Yuanto, (2003) also suggested board size of five board members. This was 
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also supported by Yammeesri and Herath (2010) who suggest that the board of 
directors can do their tasks effectively when the board size is not more than seven or 
eight members. Some practitioners and academics strongly believe that board size is 
a function of factors which include age of the firm, its size and the industry to which 
it belongs (Lawal, 2012). 
2.5 Board Composition  
Board composition is the proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
compared to executive directors. Executive directors are inside directors who 
participate directly in the day to day management of the company. Independent 
outside directors, on the other hand are directors who provide the desired outside eye 
in ensuring that the shareholders’ interests are safeguarded (Lawal, 2012). Generally 
a director who is a full time employee of a company is deemed to be an inside 
director, while a director whose primary employment is not with the firm is deemed 
to be an outside director (Tricker, 2009).  
This distinction is derived from the extent of their participation in firm management. 
Inside directors are those directors that are also managers and or current offices in 
the firm while outside directors (also known as external or non-executive directors); 
there are directors who are affiliated, and others who are independent. Affiliated 
directors are non-employee diretors with personal or business relationship with the 
company while independent directors are those that have neither personal nor 
business relationship with the company (Bhakat and Black, 2002). In order to 
effectively fulfill their monitoring role, boards of directors must have some degree 
of independence from management (Dahya and McConnell, 2007).  
Board independence is by and large influenced by how it is composed. A board is 
said to be independent if made up of more non-execute directors than executive 
directors. The independent outside director brings to fruition the desired neutrality 
and minimise bias in the board processes (Bhakat and Black, 2002). The global 
economy appears to have become caught up in what might be described as ‘outside 
director’s euphoria’ (Dahya and McConnell, (2007). The authors contend that in 
large measure, this presumption rests on faith rather than evidence. Whilst most of 
the codes for best practices have emphasised the need for mix directorship with 
greater non-executive representation, empirical evidence remains conflicting with 
respect to whether such inclusion significantly induces firm performance.  
2.6 CEO Duality 
A crucial monitoring mechanism based on the agency perspective is the separation 
of the roles of CEO from chairman. CEO duality exists when a firm’s CEO also 
serves as the Chairperson of the board of directors (Kang, 2010). CEO duality, by 
definition, is counterintuitive to the tenets of agency theory if the role of the board is 
to monitor the CEO and other agents (Carty, 2012). This is typical of CEOs with 
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long tenure and is common in the United States with approximately 80 percent of 
the Standard and poor’s 500 companies employing a single person to serve in both 
roles (Carty, 2012). The proponents of this duality role believe that allowing just one 
person to function as the chairperson and CEO will provide a beneficial platform 
that is not potentially detrimental. For example the greater levels of information and 
knowledge possessed by a joint CEO/Chairperson will enable him to better manage 
and direct the board’s discussions and agenda. Others have suggested that this duality 
role is more efficient and therefore more sensible form of governance (Adams, 
2009).  
2.7 Board Diversity 
Board diversity is premised on two main corporate governance theories, namely 
stakeholders and resource dependency theories (Kang, 2010). Carpenter and 
Westphal (2010) assert that for a board to be diverse it ought to have individuals not 
necessarily from different cultural It is argued that demographically diverse directors 
are more independent, as they are less likely to be part of an ‘old boys’ network 
(Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). 
2.8 Corporate Performance 
How to measure business performance still remains a debatable subject amongst 
business practitioners, consultants and academics as organizations can generally use 
objective and subjective measures to assess their success. Objective measures mostly 
encompass comparing corporate performance with financial measures, while 
subjective measures refer to personal perceptions about business performance 
(Reijonen, 2008).  Traditionally, business success has been assessed by financial 
measures like, return on assets employed, return on sales, growth in revenues, 
Tobin’s Q, return on investment, return on assets, sales revenue, return on equity, 
earnings per share, net profit margin, stock returns and economic embedded value, 
market share (Chenhall and Smith, 2007; Reijonen, 2008). The use and reliance on 
financial measures of business performance has been supported by various authors. 
For instance, Verbeeten and Boons (2009) argue that financial measures are 
subjected to internal controls which make them reliable; they are also reported 
externally and hence are subject to public scrutiny.  
On the contrary, Chow and Van der Stede (2006) criticise the traditional financial 
measures of performance for being flawed by the use of historical data, which is not 
reliable in assessing corporate performance. Traditional financial measures are 
difficult to obtain and the organisations have a tendency to conceal some financial 
information that is useful in assessing their performance (Salameh, Abu-Serdaneh 
and Zurikat (2009; Jusoh, 2008; Tang and Zhang, 2005). Due to these shortcomings 
of financial measures, many companies are now implementing broader based 
measures of their performance that include the non-financial measures  for example 
market share, customer satisfaction, employee turnover and new product 
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development (Verbeeten and Boons, 2009; Wilkes, 2004). Jusoh (2008) argues that 
the strength of non-financial measures lies in their ability to provide insight into 
business processes and outcomes to be better predictors of future corporate 
performance than the historical financial measures.  
Amongst the so many non-financial measures of corporate performance; gross 
premium written, product innovation and quality; customer retention; quality and 
quick decision making are the measures adopted in this study. Apart from the 
arguments already put forward in favour of non-financial measures, the chosen 
measures of corporate performance are more specific to the business processes in the 
non-life insurance sector and data on these is not sensitive and therefore respondents 
will be eager to respond and participate. As advised by Chow and Van der Stede 
(2006) and Atkinson and Brown (2001), the subjective approach was used in this 
study to measure corporate performance of non-life insurance firms. These include 
gross premium written and customer retention.  
 
3. Research Methodology 
The study adopted a quantitative approach to collect data from the non-life insurance 
firms in Zimbabwe that were stratified into strata namely:  insurers, reinsurers and 
broking companies operating in Harare as this is where most firms are headquartered. 
From these strata board 170 members were randomly selected. Self-administered 
questionnaires were sent through the email or drop-off method.  
3.1 Reliability and Validity 
The internal consistency reliability of the questionnaire was tested by computing the 
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient. The reliability of each scale was checked. As 
indicated in Table 3, all the scales in the study yielded an alpha value greater than 
0.7, board size (0.746), board composition (0.733), CEO duality (0.856) and board 
diversity (0.801), which means that the scales for all the constructs were reliable. 
Table 1 depicts the internal reliability statistics of the scales used in this study. 
Table 1. Reliability statistics 
Variables Number of Items Cronbach's Alpha value 
Board Size 5 0.746 
Board Composition 6 0.733 
CEO Duality 5 0.856 
Board Diversity 7 0.801 
A pilot study was undertaken to ensure face and content validity of the questionnaire 
and check that it was understandable, acceptable and captured the gist of the 
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research.  The feedback gave an opportunity to modify and improve the 
questionnaire by making adjustments to some questions that lacked clarity. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Sample Demographics  
A total of 170 questionnaires were distributed and 140 of them were completed, 
marking an overall response rate of 82.4%, with the respective response rates for 
each strata as shown in Table 2. The gender profile of the respondents revealed that 
male respondents (n=84 constituting 60%), were more than female respondents 
(n=56 constituting 40%) of the total respondents. In terms of the educational 
background of the respondents, the results indicates 112 were degree holders, while 
12 were holding post graduate degrees and 16 were diploma holders. Responses 
regarding the current position were as follows: executive directors (n=36; 26%), 
CEOs (n=32; 23%), non-executive directors (n=24; 17%), independent directors 
(n=24; 17%), and board chairmen (n=16; 11%), doubling as CEOs and chairmen 
(n=8; 6%),  
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Before testing the effect of corporate board characteristics on the performance of 
insurance companies, Pearson’s correlation analysis was carried out to test the 
direction and strength of relationships between these variables. The Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient ranges from +1 for a perfect positive correlation to -1 for a 
perfect negative correlation (Welman, Kruger and Mitchel, 2005). Table 2 depicts 
the correlation results. 
Table 2. Board Characteristics and Business Performance 
Factors BS BC CD BD BP 
Board size (BS) 1     
Board composition (BC) .452* 1    
CEO duality (CD) .280* .090* 1   
Board diversity (BD) .491* .377* .198 1  
Business performance (BP)  .331* .286 -.379 .473* 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.   
The results depicted in Table 3 demonstrate significant weak but positive 
correlations between the three characteristics of corporate performance: board 
composition (r= 0.286, p<0.01), board diversity (r= 0.473, p<0.01) and board size 
(r=0.331, 0.01) However, CEO duality (r= -0.379, p<0.01) showed a weak and 
negative association with business performance.  
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Similar findings about the positive correlations between business performance and 
corporate governance characteristics (board composition, diversity and size) are 
reported by authors namely Yasser, Enterbang and Mansor (2011), Rovers (2011) 
and Abidin, Kamal and Jusoff (2009). The result showing a negative association 
between CEO duality and business performance is consistent with Brown and 
Robinson (2004) and Bokpin, Kyereboach and Aboagye (2006). 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
After testing correlations between the variables, the study further carried out a 
regression analysis because as correlations analysis only measure the magnitude and 
direction of a correction but do not to establish the predictive relationship between 
variables. Regression analysis was conducted to ascertain the predictive power of 
corporate governance characteristics (board diversity, composition, size and CEO 
duality) on business performance. Table 3 presents the regression results showing 
the predictive power of each factor on business performance. 
Table 3. Regression analysis between corporate governance characteristics and 
business performance 
Dependent variable: 
corporate performance 
 
Predictor variables Std error Beta t-value p-value 
Constant 11.43  2.35 0.000 
Board size 0.028 -0.15 1.12 0.031 
Board composition 0.023 0.21 1.11 0.033 
CEO duality 0.010 -0.37 2.76 0.021 
Board diversity 0.037 0.17 3.01 0.019 
R =63.23; R-squared = 65.05; Adjusted R-squared =60.01; F = 22.05; ** significant at 
p<0.01 
The results depicted in Table 3 indicate that the four characteristics of corporate 
governance had an adjusted R-squared value of 60.01 which demonstrates that the 
corporate governance characteristics explained about 60% of the variance in 
business performance. Table 4 also shows the results of the beta coefficients. The 
results reveal that board size measured by the number of directors has a statistically 
significant negative relationship with business performance (β = -0.15, p<0.05), thus 
confirming the hypothesis 1 that a smaller board has a positive influence on business 
performance of non-life insurance firms in Zimbabwe. The result is consistent with 
prior studies (Yasser et al., 2011, Abidin et al., 2009, Bokpin et al., 2006). 
The relationship between board composition and business performance is positive 
and significant (β =0.21, p<0.05). This is a demonstration that from the sampled non-
life insurance firms in Zimbabwe, there is a positive relationship between an 
organisation’s performance and the presence of non- executive directors who sit on 
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the board (Yasser et al., 2011). The outcome is in agreement with previous studies 
(Bhagat and Black, 2002, Sanda et al., 2006).  Therefore hypothesis 2 stating that 
board composition positively impacts on business performance of non-life insurance 
firms in Zimbabwe is supported. 
The results also show that CEO/Chairman duality has a negative influence on 
business performance as the beta coefficient is -0.37. This shows that the sampled 
non-life insurance companies in Zimbabwe are in favour of having one person being 
a board chair and the other being the chief executive officer. The implication is that 
the performance of sampled non-life insurance firms in Zimbabwe improves if two 
people occupy the positions of the board chair and the chief executive. The result is 
in agreement with previous studies (Christensen et al., 2010, Bokpin et al., 2006, 
Brown et al., 2004). Therefore hypothesis 3 that states that CEO/Chairman duality 
negatively influences business performance of non-life insurance firms in Zimbabwe 
accepted. 
The relationship between board diversity and business performance as shown in 
Table 4 is positive and statistically significant (β=0. 17, p<0.05). This implies that 
the sampled short non-life insurance firms in Zimbabwe need a well-diversified 
board because board members of different gender, education background, and work 
experiences share their different ideas to improve business performance. The 
outcome is consistent with a study by Rovers (2011). Hypothesis 4 stating that board 
diversity positively impacts on the performance of short term insurance firms in 
Zimbabwe is accepted.   
 
5. Recommendations 
The findings that about the influence of board size, board composition, CEO duality 
and board diversity influence corporate performance have relevance for managers 
and owners, as well as researchers and academics. Management should be cognizant 
of how board configurations and leadership structure may impact their corporate 
performance. Thus, it is of paramount importance that firms should take a serious 
consideration into the size of their boards as results show that board size affects 
effectiveness of the board above some desired threshold. Findings of this study 
reveal an optimal board size of between 7 and 9 members is the most ideal. 
Furthermore, the study shows that female board members are not just mere figures, 
but rather contribute significantly to board strategic decision making, gross premium 
written, customer retention and product innovation. Accordingly, firms should 
include women as well to be part of their board of directors. 
Additionally, the finding that the proportion of outside directors and CEO duality 
were negatively related to corporate performance has practical implications as well. 
From the shareholders’ standpoint, having greater outsider representation and 
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avoiding duality is an effective way to monitor management. Moreover, to 
effectively fulfill their monitoring role, boards of directors must have some degree 
of independence from management. Indeed outside directors can play a significant 
role in arbitrating in disagreements between internal managers and help to reduce 
agency problems. The recommendation is that a board should ideally have more 
independent outside directors than inside executive directors. The independent 
outside directors bring to fruition the much desired neutrality and eliminates bias in 
the board processes. The study, just like the Cadbury Report, recommends having at 
least three outside directors. 
Another crucial monitoring mechanism based on the agency perspective is the 
separation of the roles of CEO from chairman. The practice of CEO duality is not 
advisable because it threatens the independence of the board. The study recommends 
that the roles of the CEO and chairman be taken by two different people. It is also 
recommended that non-life insurance companies should have boards that are up 
made of individuals not necessarily from different cultural backgrounds but those 
from different academic orientations, which then fosters collaboration. Thus 
diversity of boards should represent both demographic and qualifications of the 
members.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The major objective of this study was to establish the relationship between board 
characteristics and corporate performance with particular reference to non-life 
insurance firms. The results of the study confirm that board characteristics (board 
composition, diversity, and size) exhibit a positive predictive relationship with the 
performance of non-life insurance firms. However, CEO/Chairman duality showed 
a negative relationship with business performance. The results lend support to 
previous streams of research, which demonstrate that board characteristics have a 
positive relationship with business performance. Therefore, non-life insurance 
companies need to be cognizant of board characteristics in order to improve their 
performance. Moreover , the findings in this research has practical relevance for the 
selection process of directors as it highlights the importance of having an appropriate 
mix of competences and qualifications on the board.  
 
7. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
Although this study has provided some useful information about the relationship 
between board characteristics and corporate performance measured by qualitative 
indicators, the results of study may be interpreted with caution because of the 
following limitations. The use of structured questionnaires to collect data limited the 
depth of information received from the board members. The reliance on the 
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subjective views of corporate performance is a limitation in the study in terms of 
generalisation of the results to other companies because they could have different 
views about board characteristics and corporate performance.  
In addition, considering that the sample population was drawn from Harare, and 
taking into account that there are several non-life insurance companies operating in 
other provinces whose conditions might be different from those found in Harare, the 
generalisation of the results therefore needs to be treated with caution. The other 
limitation of this study is that it focused on only four characteristics of the board of 
directors. The model could be extended to take board processes, accountability and 
social responsibility into consideration. The other limitation is that it would have 
been better if this study had a longitudinal perspective. This study is essentially 
cross-sectional, looking at board characteristics at a particular point in time. Future 
research could replicate the study in other provinces in order to test the validity and 
reliability of the scale. Another prospect for future research is to conduct 
comparative studies of the relationship between board characteristics and corporate 
performance, for example between non-life insurance companies in a developed and 
an emerging country.   
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